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 Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses
 Too Serious a Matter to be Left to the
 Generals? Parliament and the Army in
 Wartime Portugal, 19 14-18
 The conflict between national assemblies and army high commands was a
 common feature of the political landscape of most belligerent countries during
 the first world war. There were, of course, variations to this conflict, as
 the power balance between parliaments, governments and military high
 commands differed from country to country. After having conceded extra
 powers to the executive branch and having exercised restraint over the military
 handling of the war, due to the general belief that the war would be brief,
 national assemblies began to reassert their authority. The reason was simple -
 military stagnation and a succession of failed offensives led parliamentarians
 to attempt to regain control of the war effort, to reform it through criticism
 and new ideas. Clemenceau's witticism, 'War is too serious a business to be left
 to the Generals', captures this new mood perfectly.
 1916, the year of Falkenhayn's great attrition battle at Verdun, saw the
 French parliament mounting its challenge to Joffre, responsible for the 1915
 'nibbling' offensives and for the weakness of the Verdun sector. Joffre may
 have been protected by a government which associated its permanence in
 power with that of the army's commander-in-chief, but in the France of
 the Third Republic, where no real checks existed to the legislative branch's
 authority in peacetime, Joffre was involved in a race against time either to win
 the war or to be removed from command. Once the mood of the parliament
 had turned against the victor of the Marne, and the deputies and senators had
 overcome their initial reluctance to disturb the army during the war, a replace-
 ment for Joffre was quickly found. 1916 was also the year in which Germany
 declared war on Portugal, following the seizure of German merchant ships in
 Portuguese ports around the globe. Portugal's war effort was to be marked by
 great material and military difficulties, and by a difficult relationship between,
 on the one hand, the governments of Ant6nio Jose d'Almeida (Evolutionist
 Party) and Afonso Costa (Democratic Party), and on the other the army sent
 by both men to Portugal's African colonies and to the centre of the European
 battlefield - Flanders. Although this relationship has been the object of recent
 study,' its insertion into the overall domestic political balance of power during
 1 Jose Medeiros Ferreira, O Comportamento Politico dos Militares (Lisbon 1992).
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 the Great War has not been attempted, leaving unanswered questions pertain-
 ing to the role of the Portuguese parliament in wartime - was it informed of
 events at the front? And, if so, did it attempt to interfere with the army's con-
 duct of the war?
 The constitution of 1911 made the young Portuguese Republic a parlia-
 mentary regime, with a balance of power, on paper, similar to that of the
 French Third Republic. Restrictions on the franchise and the voluntary exclu-
 sion from politics of monarchists meant that both houses of parliament were
 controlled by the three descendants of the historic Portuguese Republican
 Party (Unionists, Evolutionists and Democrats), and especially by Afonso
 Costa's Democrats who, after the 1915 elections, enjoyed an absolute
 majority in both chambers. This control of the legislative body by a single and
 disciplined party represented the first major difference in the de facto balance
 of power in the Portuguese and French cases - for as long as the Portuguese
 government's leader continued to be the Democratic Party's leader, the execu-
 tive would be in a position of strength vis-a-vis the legislative. The second
 major difference was the ambiguous loyalty of the army to the new regime
 (as opposed to the whole of the armed forces, the navy being distinctly repub-
 lican). The army had fought on both the monarchist and the republican sides
 during the revolution which toppled the monarchy in October 1910, and no
 great purge of the officer corps followed, only 14 officers being dismissed, in
 addition to six deserters and 30 resignations.2
 The army's position in terms of loyalty to the regime was rendered more
 dubious after the outbreak of the Great War, when the officer corps provided
 the personnel and the support for the Pimenta de Castro dictatorship, which
 governed Portugal in the first half of 1915, and which was overthrown by a
 violent revolution in which the army took no part. The army, as a result, added
 a degree of instability to the constitutional balance of power in Portugal. Jose
 Medeiros Ferreira points out that, when the Great War began, the army was
 not yet a unified political force. Only the most skilled of politicians could hope
 to lead such a potentially unreliable army into an enterprise of the Great War's
 magnitude and keep the various factions apart and, hence, committed to the
 war effort. One of the means employed by Afonso Costa, without doubt a
 skilled politician, was to allow for no criticism to be directed at the High
 Command, even from the parliament, and it is the employment of this perilous
 tactic, as well as its consequences, that this article addresses, through an
 examination of the secret sessions of the Chamber of Deputies, which took
 place in July 1917, and which have been surprisingly neglected by Portuguese
 historians.
 In August and November 1914, as a result of both the European war and
 of Portugal's seemingly impending entry into that conflict, the powers of
 the executive, headed by the future President Bernardino Machado, were
 strengthened, a process which repeated itself in 1916, both immediately before
 2 Ibid., 43.
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 and after the German declaration of war. Such actions, however, did not mean
 that the Chamber of Deputies had become completely subservient to the
 government. At the end of 1916 concerted actions by the more conservative
 Unionist Party and breakaway Evolutionist deputies, who together formed
 the 'Parliamentary Bloc', severely shook the Sacred Union government led
 by Ant6nio Jose d'Almeida (composed of Evolutionist and Democratic
 ministers),3 and in April 1917 that same Sacred Union government was
 toppled on the grounds of parliamentary prestige and prerogatives by Demo-
 cratic backbenchers and the Bloc.4
 Members of Parliament of all belligerent countries fought in the first world
 war, and Portugal was no exception.5 Through these men and other, private
 contacts, the rest of Portugal's parliamentarians were able to create a more
 detailed idea of the nature and the problems of the country's war effort than
 the rest of the population. Whether simply out of concern for the men of the
 expeditionary forces, or because military difficulties provided an excellent
 weapon against the huge governmental majority, opposition deputies, from an
 early date, began to use parliamentary debates on the course of the war to
 embarrass the government. The German bombardment of Funchal (December
 1916) provided such an opportunity, Hermano de Medeiros, a deputy from
 the Azores, pointing out that
 Any apprehensions that may exist should not be confined to Funchal, they should be
 extended to the Azores. I am convinced at this moment that the islands have no means of
 defence against a possible attack, the same being true of Madeira.6
 The same deputy would speak out again in July 1917 when Ponta Delgada, in
 the Azores, fell victim to fire from a German U-Boat, and called for a secret
 session 'so that we may tell you [the government] things that cannot be told in
 a public session'.7
 3 Because of laws designed to delay the trial of those involved in an attempted coup - laws
 which were deemed to be retroactive and as such unconstitutional.
 4 This time the conflict arose because of the institutional strengthening of the newly-created
 National Economic Council, seen by the backbenchers as an affront to parliament. The govern-
 ment's defeat occurred during Afonso Costa's absence from the country, and the Democratic
 deputies who brought the government down claimed that Costa would never have approved of the
 government's action.
 5 The polemic which, in 1917, surrounded Brito Camacho's postponement (and later abandon-
 ment) of his military obligations as a doctor in the military reserve, and the acceptance of his
 decision by the rest of the Chamber of Deputies, shows that it was possible for a deputy who
 invoked his rights as a representative of the popular will to forego serving at the front. Brito
 Camacho's case is doubly interesting both because it reasserted the primacy of the rights of the
 deputy and because the leader of the opposition was establishing a precedent. Jaime Cortesao, at
 the time a Democratic deputy, attacking Brito Camacho, stated that 'The fundamental code [the
 constitution] cannot be omniscient. Some rights are degrading and the right to remain in the
 country, to not go to war, to not accept one's military duty, is a right that humiliates this Chamber.'
 The whole debate can be found in the Didrio da Camara dos Deputados, 13.2.1917.
 6 Ibid., 4.12.1916.
 7 Ibid., 4.7.1917.
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 Campaigns in Africa, notably the 1916 expedition to Mozambique, were
 also an object of criticism.8 After the siege and defeat of Newala, in German
 East Africa, announced by the Prime Minister and Minister for the Colonies
 on 5 December, Jose Barbosa, presenting a negative overview of the govern-
 ment's achievements, asked: '[Did the government] increase our colonial
 prestige? No. [Cheers] Ah! Mr President, it is better not to talk about that
 matter . .'. Alfredo de Magalhaes, bitter after his arrest by military authorities
 during the December 1916 coup attempt, attacked the government on all
 fronts, including the African campaign. Boer troops were carrying out the
 tasks which should have been dealt with by the Portuguese, a fact which, in the
 deputy's opinion, would have serious diplomatic repercussions. Magalhaes
 asked, 'Why did we invade German colonies without the necessary numbers?',
 and stressed that those responsible for the defeat should be identified. Finally,
 Magalhaes asked why the reports written by the commanders of earlier
 African expeditions - Pereira d'Eqa and Alves Rogadas - had not yet been
 published by the government, adding: 'If [parliament] were to live up to its
 noble function, it would demand a complete account of all the government's
 actions.'9 Tamagnini Barbosa, another member of the parliamentary bloc, and
 a frequent speaker on African topics, denounced the government on 6 June
 1917 for being too harsh in charging the 'hut tax' in Angola, which had led to
 a recent wave of revolt, resulting in the death of 87 Portuguese. The following
 day, Tamagnini Barbosa claimed in the Chamber of Deputies that
 It seems that the State has not benefited in any way from the recent expeditions sent [to
 Angola], because the pacification of Angola is on exactly the same footing that it was years
 ago, despite the enormous sacrifices that the State has had to make in lives, material and
 money. 0
 Parliamentary opposition to the government on the subject of Portugal's
 war effort reached a peak in the summer of 1917, when the Minister for War,
 Norton de Matos, announced the results of talks in London regarding the size
 of Portugal's commitment to the European battlefield - an army corps of
 55,000 men, with monthly shipments of 4,000 men to cover losses, and an
 independent heavy artillery force (1,500 men) to serve with the French army.
 The Minister added that 30-35,000 men had been sent to Africa (for a total of
 45,000 soldiers, including African troops, in both Angola and Mozambique),
 8 Incursions were launched early in 1914 from German East Africa and German South-west
 Africa into Portuguese territory, Germany's hopes of expansion into Mozambique and Angola
 being well documented. Fighting took place in both Portuguese colonies, and a succession of
 expeditions was sent from Portugal to her African colonies. In 1916 the government urged
 General Gil, the commander of the troops in Mozambique, to invade East Africa in order to
 capture part of its territory before the colony fell to the British and Belgian troops operating in the
 area, and the invasion took place with, as we shall see, disastrous results. One of Sid6nio Pais's
 first actions was to reveal Gil's report to the press; its conclusions can be read in any leading
 Portuguese daily after 22.12.1917.
 9 Didrio da Cdmara dos Deputados, 2.2.1917.
 10 Ibid., 7.6.1917.
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 and that a reserve of 40,000 men would be needed in Portugal itself. The
 opposition leader, Brito Camacho, called for secret sessions and, once these
 had been agreed to, claimed, while still in a public session, that the govern-
 ment had not been given the power to conclude military conventions, and that
 troops were being sent to Africa 'like herds to the slaughter' - an allegation
 that some men had been sent to Africa without having received even basic
 military training.1
 The secret sessions of parliament lasted from 11 to 26 July, a troubled time
 in a Lisbon hit first by a construction workers' strike and then by martial law
 in response to the strike. The Bloc left the sessions on 25 July, however, leaving
 the lone Socialist deputy as an opposition, effectively bringing the sessions to
 an end. The range of criticism to which the government was subjected over
 two weeks was enormous but, because the discipline of the Democratic Party
 and its allies - the mainstream Evolutionists - held firm, the Parliamentary
 Bloc found itself unable to force the government into any concessions or even
 into a full disclosure of all information pertaining to Portugal's involvement in
 the war, be it on a military plane or a political one. The Bloc's objections were
 built around the idea of parliamentary prestige, a prestige it saw as being
 tarnished by the ignorance in which the Chamber of Deputies had been kept
 since, essentially, 1914. Starved of information, and having relinquished many
 parliamentary prerogatives to the executive at the start of the European war,
 the opposition, faced by what it saw as the country's deepening crisis and the
 poor handling of military affairs, now sought to re-establish parliament's
 powers through a series of investigations into the treaties and conventions
 which Portugal might have signed since 1914, and into the actual military
 campaigns. The government, for its part, refused, claiming that it would be
 folly to allow such investigations to take place while Portugal's armies were on
 the field of battle, and before the final peace negotiations. We shall concentrate
 on the military criticisms made by the parliamentary opposition, and on the
 government's response to those criticisms.12
 The Bloc's criticisms of Portugal's ongoing military effort singled out the
 lack of adequate preparation which had so far characterized that effort, and
 identified political interference as the main reason for the many deficiencies
 which had resulted in terrible suffering and unnecessary loss of life among the
 fighting men in Africa and in Europe, not to mention massive expense.
 According to opposition deputies, a political decision had been made as a
 result of which soldiers in Africa would be sacrificed, in terms of equipment,
 so that the soldiers in the more visible battlefields of France might enjoy
 11 Ibid., 6.7.1917.
 12 This is not to say that the attempt to re-establish parliament's rights in the diplomatic sphere
 is without interest, or that it was a secondary matter, as the words of Moura Pinto make clear:
 'Today this convention with France, tomorrow one with Russia, the following week another one
 with Serbia. All of this at a time when the country is already making too large a sacrifice, as is said
 and felt everywhere. It is very easy to negotiate with the blood of others, and then, with a recourse
 to easy rhetoric, to claim that blood as one's own! Only parliament has the right to negotiate when
 it comes to such sacred raw material. Enough excesses. The Executive in its place.'
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 parity with the Allies. This decision, dubious to begin with, had been rendered
 ridiculous following the Allies' insistence on standardization in the trenches,
 which had led to the stockpiling in France of Portugal's modern military equip-
 ment, badly needed in Africa, where soldiers had to contend with diverse and
 obsolete artillery and infantry weapons. Vasconcellos e Sa, an Evolutionist
 member of the Bloc, forwarded a motion attributing responsibility for the
 military 'disasters' at Naulila, Rovuma and Newala to the expeditions' faulty
 organization in personnel and material, and to the government's unwillingness
 to send reinforcements while attempting to run the campaigns, by cable, from
 Lisbon.13 Tamagnini Barbosa described the medical component of the
 Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France (CEP) as wholly inadequate, and
 pointed out that men unfit for military duty were being sent to the front,
 including consumptives. He added that administrative tasks in the field armies
 should be alternated with trench duty, to ensure the disappearance of the
 'shirkers' - men entrusted with duties at the rear bases and depots, with the
 handling of statistics and with translation work.14 The same deputy also
 highlighted the terrible shortages of adequate medical material sent to
 Mozambique for the campaign against the Germans in East Africa, and the
 poor use of what resources were available5 - an accusation seconded by
 Tomas Rosa, an officer, and the sole Democratic deputy to speak out against
 the handling of the war.16
 More seriously still, Tamagnini Barbosa delivered a stinging attack on
 General Gil,l7 the commander of the unfortunate 1916 Mozambique expedi-
 tion, claiming that the General had remained 60 leagues behind the fighting,
 playing bridge with his entourage and displaying total lack of interest in the
 plight of the men assigned to him, that he had neglected to secure positions
 between the rear bases and the advancing troops, leaving both exposed, and
 that he had failed to ensure that the advancing troops carried out an effective
 reconnaissance, which led them into the German trap at Newala.18 Tamagnini
 Barbosa did not hesitate to qualify Gil's performance as 'disastrous for the
 country and shameful for the Portuguese army'. Casimiro de Sa spoke, among
 other topics, of shortages of food for the soldiers of the CEP at a time when
 other Allied soldiers were adequately fed.'9
 13 Transcripts of the Secret Sessions of the Chamber of Deputies, 41.
 14 An obvious reference to Sebastiao Costa, son of the Prime Minister and a translator in the
 CEP. Transcripts, 11 ff.
 15 Transcripts, 45 ff.
 16 According to Tomas Rosa, a German emissary advised the Portuguese troops crossing the
 Rovuma river into German territory to move their first aid station, located 30 metres away from
 an artillery battery supporting the river crossing. Transcripts, 47.
 17 Tamagnini Barbosa accused the government of choosing Gil because of his Republican lean-
 ings, despite the fact that he had no prior African experience - a charge which the government
 did not deny.
 18 According to Tamagnini Barbosa, apart from heavy casualties, including POWs, the Newala
 defeat cost Portugal 1 radio post, 4 artillery pieces, over 500 shells, 8 machine-guns, 1,500 rifles,
 60,000 rounds of ammunition, 5 lorries and 100 ammunition carts.
 19 Transcripts, 24.
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 The most damaging accusation against the army came from the already-
 mentioned Tomas Rosa, who read out to the Chamber a series of sworn
 statements made by officers and sergeants who had taken part in the 1915
 expedition to Angola.20 According to these statements, General Pereira d'E;a,
 the commander of the expedition, had condoned, and possibly ordered, brutal
 reprisals against the tribes which, aided by Germans in South West Africa, had
 revolted against the Portuguese in 1914. This rebellion had been crushed only
 after a long campaign, marked by large set-piece battles such as that of
 Mongua, during which 2,000 Portuguese soldiers had been surrounded by an
 estimated 12,000 tribesmen, 5,000 of whom had rifles.21 According to the
 statements read out by Tomas Rosa, large-scale hangings and other atrocities
 had been carried out in order to punish the rebellious tribes, which had
 seriously hampered the Portuguese army in its retreat after the 1914 defeat at
 Naulila. Hundreds of men were allegedly hanged, in the full knowledge of
 officers, and surrendering families were split up, men being hanged and
 women and children being forced to march in the direction of rival tribes'
 territory - essentially a slower death sentence. One surrendering man, having
 been identified as a notable of his tribe, was crucified for a day before he, too,
 was hanged. A letter, written by a soldier and read out by Tomas Rosa, stated
 that 'We have orders to kill all the natives from the age of 10 upwards'.22
 How did the government react to this barrage of highly damaging criticism?
 Essentially by accusing the opposition of lack of patriotism in its airing of
 grievances, and by promising full enquiries once the war had ended and the
 peace settlement had been finalized. Brito Camacho was the main target of the
 government's broadside. Afonso Costa accused him of failing to see the moral
 advantages of Portugal's participation in the war, of being petty and inferior in
 his treatment of the war as a business - weighing up Portugal's help to Britain
 and France ('glorious nations') against gains to be made from that help.
 20 These statements are included in the transcripts as an appendix, and are typed, as opposed to
 the debates themselves.
 21 Joao Ferreira do Amaral, A Mentira de Flandres e... .o Medo (Lisbon 1922), 141ff.
 22 What follows is the translation of one of the statements, made by a certain Francisco Filipe
 de Sousa: 'I hereby declare that, having served in the expedition to the South of Angola in the year
 1915, I was told of deeds so inhuman that I will refrain from reproducing them here, as they have
 already been reproduced in other statements of which I know and which I confirm.
 While crossing the zone of operations, as head of supplies and uniforms, I saw many black men
 and women hanging from trees, and, from one tree in Humbe, a veritable bunch of humans. They
 called that tree the "fatal baobab". I saw many blacks being hung on that tree and I was told that
 the hangings were always preceded by an order from above. The blacks were buried before being
 dead and one black hangman, having been asked by me why this was being done, replied that he
 had orders from the "maneputo", their name for the General. The blacks were hanged with
 barbed wire, and although I cannot give a precise figure for those who were hanged, I nevertheless
 know that it was high .... I was told by the military commander of Humbe, Infantry Captain
 J.V.C., that upon taking command of that locality he had been forced to carry out a large clean-up
 operation, for the number of blacks who had been killed by hanging was so high that he feared an
 outbreak of disease .... I have knowledge of orders having been given for the transformation of
 bullets into "dum-dum" bullets, designed to cause great destruction in the human body, so that the
 General's name might not be forgotten among the blacks for at least five years after our victory.'
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 Brito Camacho is an unfortunate man. He is driven by fate to do harm. I will not ask him to
 change his ways. Let him go on. One day he will be struck by remorse.... Having had the
 chance to render services to his country, and to contribute to the resurgence of his
 Fatherland, he rendered no such service and only harmed the Republic.23
 Personal remarks aside, the government was content to allow its majority to
 stifle any opposition moves. As Afonso Costa put it, 'The government has
 received from the parliament all the necessary authorizations to wage war and
 thus carries out all actions that might be necessary and convenient towards
 that end'.24 The Prime Minister, moreover, on various occasions challenged the
 opposition to a vote of confidence. However, while delaying tactics worked in
 relation to parliamentary inquests into the signing of conventions, into the
 quality of the medical service being provided for the men at the various fronts,
 and into the appointment of General Gil as the commander of the 1916
 expedition, the question of the atrocities in Angola could not be dealt with in
 the same manner - not only because of the repugnant nature of the alleged
 deeds, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because General Pereira d'Eqa,
 following his energetic pacification of Southern Angola, had been given the
 coveted post of Military Governor of Lisbon.
 As we have already seen, Lisbon, during the secret sessions, was in a state
 of martial law, constitutional guarantees thus being suspended and power
 residing in the hands of the army. An absurd situation had been created -
 while the Portuguese capital was run by a General, the question of whether or
 not that same General was a war criminal was being discussed in the
 Portuguese legislature.25 Brito Camacho, while pointing out that 'the so-called
 inferior races are merely backward - one cannot civilize them through their
 elimination', stated that under no circumstances should Pereira d'Eqa remain
 at his post. Moura Pinto seconded his leader's demands: 'I believe it to be a
 rudimentary principle of military justice that a unit commander should answer
 for all the errors, mistakes or crimes which take place under his command,
 until he uncovers the names of those responsible.'26 Pressing home his attack,
 Moura Pinto turned his fire against the democratic government:
 It is absurd for the Minister of War to want to maintain in a very sensitive post - as is that
 of supreme governor of Lisbon during a suspension of constitutional guarantees - a General
 23 Transcripts, 17.
 24 Deputy Francisco Trancoso, a Democrat, put forward the following motion: 'The Chamber,
 believing that the government has proceeded within the sphere of the parliamentary authoriza-
 tions in all that refers to the state of war with Germany, and that its action has always been
 oriented in harmony with the high interests of the Fatherland and the Republic, as well as consti-
 tutional precepts, moves on to the daily order of business.' Transcripts, 21.
 25 Independent republican newspapers, not to mention the working-class and monarchist press,
 unequivocally blamed the authorities for the violence which followed the construction workers'
 peaceful demonstration through the streets of Lisbon; 0 Seculo put casualties at six killed and 28
 wounded, in what it called 'a real battle', during which the Republican National Guard had 'lost
 its head'. 0 Seculo, 14.7.1917.
 26 Transcripts, 55.
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 against whom documents, so far uncontradicted, were produced in this parliament, which
 showed that the column under his command committed savage atrocities, possibly in accor-
 dance with his orders, atrocities which no state of war can justify, barbarous acts so stupidly
 cruel that only with amazement, indignation and repulsion was the Chamber able to hear
 them.27
 Moura Pinto, finally, accused the government, which seemed so reluctant to
 part company with Pereira d'Eca, of knowing about his actions in Africa and
 recognizing in them the solution to the problem of public order in the capital.
 Afonso Costa responded to these accusations swiftly, affirming his, and the
 government's, full support for the embattled General. Once again the Prime
 Minister made the issue one of confidence in the government, and once again
 his party and the majority of Evolutionists maintained their discipline.
 Moreover, Afonso Costa said that no country at war would be so foolish as to
 make public such potentially harmful information and, momentarily forget-
 ting about Portugal's civilizing mission, that Africans equated humanitarian
 concerns with weakness. In attacking General Pereira d'Eca, 'who is a man of
 honour', and whose orders in his present capacity had all been 'aimed at
 defending our institutions, as well as order and public safety', the opposition,
 according to the Prime Minister, was attempting no more than the overthrow
 of the cabinet, which revealed a lack of political wisdom, 'for, in truth, they are
 not in a position to replace it'.28
 The Bloc's solution to the problem caused by the atrocities committed by the
 Pereira d'Eca column was the reassertion of parliament's authority over
 the army, in the shape of a parliamentary enquiry into the Angolan campaign.
 The government's supporters (through back-bencher Antonio da Fonseca, a
 Democrat) replied that such an enquiry should be left to the Ministry of War
 -a view rejected by Tamagnini Barbosa, who considered it to be 'an abdica-
 tion of competences' on the part of parliament, one which would endanger its
 institutional prestige - as well as being a formula through which the truth
 would never be arrived at.29 Moura Pinto's motion, not admitted for a vote by
 the majority, called for a parliamentary enquiry into Pereira d'Esa's campaign
 and the immediate lifting of the state of siege in Lisbon. Norton de Matos
 replied that there was no question of offence to parliament, but that in the
 difficult situation facing Portugal, only the Ministries of War and the Colonies
 could carry out enquiries with the necessary secrecy. The government's victory
 was never in doubt and, on 25 July, the Parliamentary Bloc abandoned the
 secret sessions. In an interview with O Seculo, Brito Camacho made it clear
 that he no longer expected anything from the present government, and that he
 would henceforth attempt to organize all the social forces that no longer felt
 themselves to be represented by parliament - 'The country does not want a
 sectarian Republic, a Republic of factions, a Republic in which all crimes go
 unpunished and where there are no guarantees to safeguard all legitimate
 27 Ibid.
 28 Transcripts, 56.
 29 Transcripts, 57.
 93
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.110 on Wed, 14 Aug 2019 10:37:16 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Joural of Contemporary History Vol 33 No I
 interests.' Moreover, the Unionist leader hinted at what had happened in the
 secret session and the reasons for the Bloc's withdrawal.30
 The government's intransigence on the question of the proposed parlia-
 mentary enquiry into the Angolan campaign of 1915 poses a wide array of
 problems. Would Portugal's claims on its African colonies, and its intended
 civilizing mission, be tarnished by the revelations of the atrocities committed
 by its army in 1915? Would the country's wartime morale suffer as a result?
 And, most importantly, how would the army react to such an enquiry? The
 answer to the first two questions is probably no (although their exploration
 falls outside the scope of this article).31 General Pereira d'ESa was an officer of
 great prestige, as the number of subsequent hagiographies makes clear; one
 possible explanation for Afonso Costa's refusal to move against him was that
 such an action might lead the unreliable army to unite around the embattled
 General - passing the blame for the disasters in Africa to the government and,
 if necessary, removing the government from power, with disastrous con-
 sequences for Portugal's international standing. This explanation would tie in
 easily with the interventionists' hopes for the war, seen as a process through
 which two important aims could be achieved rapidly: the mobilization of the
 Portuguese population around the new regime, through an appeal to that
 population's presumed patriotism which would split monarchist and Catholic
 opinion, and the acquisition of a new international prestige, due to Portugal's
 sacrifice in the war, which would render Portugal immune from any future
 territorial challenges, from either Spain or rival colonial powers.
 The final act of the conflict between parliament and the army occurred in
 the last days before Sidonio Pais's coup, which was to transform Portugal's
 participation in the war,32 and it was organized by the deputies who had been
 in the front line and who, as a result, had direct knowledge of the Portuguese
 Expeditionary Corps' shortcomings. Jaime Cortesao, the author of one of the
 most important wartime diaries in Portugal, referred in that work to a meeting
 of the Democratic Party's deputies at the front, in which those deputies had
 30 'Look at what happened in Africa. We began to send military expeditions as soon as the war
 broke out in Europe and, having sacrificed many men and enormous sums - millions of Escudos
 - we succeeded in causing revolts in Angola and Mozambique, where the Germans are still occu-
 pying our territory. We suffered a disaster in Naulila, we suffered a disaster on the Rovuma, and
 we suffered a disaster in Newala, and on none of these subjects has the country been given any
 explanations by the government.' 0 Seculo, 2.8.1917.
 31 Thomas Pakenham's The Scramble for Africa (London 1991) illustrates the ferocity with
 which African rebellions were regularly suppressed; the revolt of the tribes in Southern Angola in
 1914 was, moreover, aided by the Germans, making the retaliatory atrocities more palatable to the
 Portuguese and Allied opinion - Germany could be portrayed as being ultimately responsible for
 all that had happened. Moreover, colonial campaigns, notably in Mozambique (curiously ignored
 by Pakenham), had provided the Portuguese army with a series of successes, and domestic
 approval, at the end of the nineteenth century.
 32 Under the Presidency of Sid6nio Pais, who had been the Portuguese Minister in Berlin until
 the German declaration of war in 1916, no reinforcements were sent to the CEP, whose first-line
 strength was quickly reduced through casualties and illness to that of a single division, incorpo-
 rated in a British Army Corps, and finally eliminated in the battle of 9.4.1918.
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 decided to attend the next session of parliament (which was to re-open in
 December 1917) in order to correct the 'serious defects and errors'33 in the
 CEP's organization, and to replace the government. According to A Capital, a
 republican, but now anti-Afonso Costa Lisbon daily, a race now developed
 between the returning deputies (Sa Cardoso, Alvaro Pope, Vitorino Godinho,
 and Joaquim Ribeiro, among others) and Afonso Costa, who had been in
 London, not only to return physically to Lisbon, but also to harness support
 among the undecided Democratic deputies.34 The prestige attached by these
 undecided Democrats to the fighting deputies was sufficiently great to pose a
 serious threat to the otherwise stable (in parliamentary terms) government.
 The fourth of December was a day of rumours and counter-rumours, and A
 Capital printed all of them - that a minority Evolutionist government was in
 the making, that Afonso Costa would fight to defend his government, that he
 would present parliament with a reshuffle once he had arrived and, finally,
 that he would resign. With the public's attention focused on the ministerial
 crisis, Sidonio Pais finalized his preparations for his assault on power,35 intelli-
 gently carried out while Afonso Costa had still not reached Lisbon.
 The failure of the secret sessions of parliament to allow the legislative
 branch to call the army to account for all the decisions which had been made
 since the beginning of Portugal's involvement in the war, many of which
 appeared, to some deputies at least, to have been harmful to Portugal's
 immediate and long-term interests, resulted both from the size and discipline
 of the government's huge majority in the Chamber of Deputies and, more
 importantly, from the government's unwillingness to allow direct challenges to
 be mounted to the army - an unwillingness more than demonstrated by the
 refusal to act against Pereira d'Eqa's continuing military rule over Lisbon. In
 order to understand this unwillingness, stronger light has to be shed on the
 relationship between the government and the army which it nominally con-
 trolled but which, having been sent into a war that many of its leaders saw as
 being irrelevant to Portugal's interests (not counting, of course, the colonies),
 had been showing grave signs of discontent.36 The Democrats, who believed
 that through participation in the war Portugal and its new regime would
 acquire a more positive, international image - readily contrastable with that
 of reactionary and neutral Spain - were willing to sacrifice the notion of
 parliamentary prestige in order to allow the army to carry out its task without
 parliamentary interference. The direct questioning by parliament, of the
 authority of a prestigious General such as Pereira d'Eqa, might just provoke
 33 Jaime Cortesao, Mem6rias da Grande Guerra (Lisbon 1919), 105.
 34 Hence the lack of a quorum on 3 December was described by A Capital as a manoeuvre by
 Afonso Costa's supporters to buy time until their leader's return.
 35 Some of the military units which participated in the coup had been earmarked for deploy-
 ment to Flanders.
 36 These signs of tension between the army and the government are readily found in the
 Documents of the Ministry of the Interior (in Lisbon's National Archives) and in the documents of
 the Ministry of War's Information Service - available for consultation at the Army's Historical
 Archive in Lisbon.
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 the army into seizing power and withdrawing from the war effort, or drasti-
 cally restructuring that war effort, as had happened in 1915 under General
 Pimenta de Castro's dictatorship (which had enjoyed considerable support
 among officers), as might have happened through the December 1916 coup led
 by the Revolutionary hero, Machado Santos, and was to happen, finally, in
 December 1917, under the leadership of Sid6nio Pais.
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